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The Politics of Security 1 
 
Julia Eckert2 
 
Abstract 
The paper examines the effects that the ‘global war on terror’ has had on notions of security 
and citizenship. Comparing legislation across various countries, it advances the thesis that 
there is a) a decisive shift in the division of powers, which also entails an abandonment of the 
principle of equality before the law; and that b) security measures introduced further the 
culturalisation of membership in a polity as well as the re-moralisation of access to rights. It 
calls for anthropological research into the effects of the social dichotomisation engendered by 
the politics of security. 
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Introduction 
 
The ‘war on terror’ has affected anti-terrorism laws and anti-terrorism policies world wide. 
New legislation has been passed in many countries; laws existing prior to September 11th 
2001 have been used with a new focus on security and prevention; and there have been 
attempts to integrate and harmonise national and international measures of combating 
terrorism in order to coordinate strategies against what is perceived as a global and globally 
coordinated threat.  
   This paper addresses two developments in the conceptualisation of citizenship that arise 
from the ‘war on terror’, namely the re-culturalisation of membership in a polity and the re-
moralisation of access to rights. Furthermore, the paper asks in what ways these developments 
are globalised, and how they are adopted, adapted, instrumentalised, and circumvented in 
different political and social contexts. It traces the ways in which the trans-nationalisation of 
the ‘war on terror’ has affected national (or regional) notions of security and danger and 
images of ‘the dangerous other’, asking what changes in the ideas of the state and of the 
nation have been promoted by the emerging culture of security, and how these changes affect 
practices of citizenship, group relations and ways of dealing with conflicts. 
 
The Omnipresent Threat 
 
The new terrorism is, of course, Islamist terrorism. There are competing criminologies of the 
so-called ‘new terrorism’ that identify either Islamist fanaticism, a clash of civilisations, US 
imperialism, Palestine or undemocratic structures in many Muslim countries as the root cause 
of Islamist terrorism, and thus hold either cultural or political and sometimes also social 
factors responsible for violence. However, security policies and measures taken are neither 
related to assumed causes of terrorism nor are they designed to remedy those causes. They are 
instead related to a specific perception of risk. The risk inherent in the ‘new terrorism’ is 
perceived as potentially immense yet at the same time elusive; that is, while possible damages 
are considered potentially apocalyptic, the actors are seen to be firstly highly dispersed and 
only loosely connected to a transnational network; secondly they are ‘invisible’, and most so 
as ‘sleepers’; and thirdly they are seen to be beyond negotiation or deterrence since they are 
said to be inspired merely by a general hatred of the West (or modernity or ‘our freedom’) and 
thus largely ‘aimlessly’ or nihilistically destructive. “New terrorists want only to express their 
wrath and cripple their enemy” (Stevenson 2001/2: 35) felt one commentator. His words 
echoed many other analyses of the alleged specificity of religious terrorism. The novelty of 
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the new terrorism, it is said, lies in the fact that it is de-territorialised in two ways: it is neither 
based in any one territory from which terrorists operate or whereto they can withdraw but it is 
potentially everywhere, in loosely connected undiscoverable sleeper cells of amateur 
terrorists; nor does it aim at territory, as insurgent or secessionist terrorism did (Diner 2004). 
Rather, it is said to be merely destructive, with a complete, indiscriminate contempt for life. 
Suicidal terrorism above all, allegedly inspired by mere hatred and alien in its motives, makes 
not only bargaining but also deterrence impossible.  
   Thus, the ‘new terrorism’ is perceived and presented as external to society to a new degree. 
Its causes or its relation to the society that it targets become secondary to an assumed essential 
alienness and a religious fanaticism that is allegedly unrelated to a social and political context. 
Terrorism comes to be perceived more and more as part of and identical to a general global 
danger, the roots of which lie not so much in ‘causes’ but in ‘culture’.  
   Thus, there is also a new concept of danger (Lepsius 2004: 66, 67, 83; Bender 2003: 138, 
139) that plays itself out in legal terms. ‘Danger’ is no longer connected to the actions of 
individuals but to a general situation of threat emanating from an elusive network and its 
fundamental ‘occidentalism’ (Buruma and Margalit 2004) in which individuals are 
replaceable.  
   Because of the characterisation of the ‘new terrorism’ as an omnipresent but elusive threat 
arising from a de-individualised (Lepsius 2004: 66) general and diffuse Islamist terror “we do 
not know where, and precisely who, the enemy is,” as one member of the EU Parliament3 
expressed. This necessitates measures that presume that the enemy could be everywhere and 
everyone – nearly. Makdisi speaks of “spectral terrorism” that offers the “foundation for a 
universal campaign of investigation, interrogation, confiscation, detention, surveillance, 
torture and punishment on, for the first time, a genuinely global scale (…) not only where it 
[terrorism] does manifest itself but where it might manifest itself, which could, of course, be 
anywhere” (Makdisi 2002: 267). 
   There is of course the question to what degree the ‘new terrorism’ is actually so new and 
whether it is really so diffuse, de-territorialised and ‘aimless’ as is claimed.4 One could 
demonstrate that there are clear and identifiable aims, even rather territorial ones, of 
transnational Islamist terrorism (see also Steinberg 2005), such as the removal of the US army 
from Saudi Arabia and now also from Iraq, or the destruction of Israel. Moreover, many of 
those Islamic insurgent groups that are now considered to be connected to the transnational 
                                                 
3 Mogens Camre, Danish member of the Union for a Europe of the Nations (UEN), European parliamentary 
debate 6.2.2002 quoted in Tsoukala (2004: 6). 
4 See also David Tucker 2001 on the similarities between old and new terrorism; Peter Waldmann 2004 
criticising the thesis that the network structures are entirely new. On the network thesis see also Mayntz 2004. 
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networks of Al Qaida, and that constitute this network, have, of course, very ‘conventional’ 
aims, such as the independence of Chechnya, the withdrawal of the Indian army from 
Kashmir, the independence of Aceh or of Mindanao. Most importantly, the characterisations 
of the ‘new terrorism’ mostly fail to see or, because of the apparent enormity of the attack of 
9/11, refuse to take into account any political context within which the ‘new terrorism’ arose. 
There have been references to the chosen traumata of the Muslim world and the grievances of 
Arab populations. But the idea that the ‘new terrorism’ might not constitute a rejection of 
modernity as such but a rejection of being shut out from it (Mamdani 2004: 19) or not being 
able to define it oneself has been obliviated by the construction of an essential alienness 
rooted in ‘culture’ and fundamentalist religion.  
   But the question of what is new and what is old about the new terrorism is not the question 
that this paper wants to raise. After all, in most cases, neither were all the laws that were now 
enacted entirely new, nor were the conflicts new that are now seen to be addressed with these 
laws. In many cases the claimed novelty related to a re-categorisation of longstanding 
conflicts, a re-interpretation of domestic issues under the banner of the terrorist threat and a 
tendency to relate both specific types of conflicts and various policy fields to the phenomena 
of terrorism and to security concerns. Thus, in most places the measures undertaken within 
the framework of the ‘war on terror’ target people, organisations and issues that are well 
known, localised and identified. They target specific categories of citizens, they are employed 
in longstanding conflicts where the novelty lies mainly in their connection to ‘terrorism’, and 
they change policies in everyday domestic fields. 
   No matter, thus, how realistic or unrealistic a description of the ‘new terrorism’ is, the 
claims to the diffuseness of the threat, the new nature of invisibility of the perpetrators, the 
new potential for destruction and the allegedly novel form of organisation in transnationally 
loosely connected cells have been the main grounds for justification of the specific measures 
taken against ‘the new terrorism’. These claims have justified:  
– indeterminate detention without charge or trial; 
– the abandonment of the presumption of innocence and the reversal of the burden of 
proof; and 
– ethnic profiling and the emergence of dual or a two tiered system of law. 
 
Structural Commonalities of the Measures 
 
Terrorism has often been defined in the new legislation in a rather vague manner that enables 
the concept to cover all sort of acts, including association or even simple contact as in the now 
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repealed Indian anti-terrorism law, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA)5, or material 
support even if unintentional as in the PATRIOT ACT.6 The term ‘terrorism’ is used not in a 
neutrally descriptive manner, describing specific forms of political violence,7 but in a 
normative manner, and some scholars have held that it can only be used in such a pejorative 
manner and have therefore abandoned the term saying, like Cynthia Mahmood, that 
“terrorism is a concept that mystifies rather than illuminates; it is a political and not an 
academic notion” (Mahmood 2001: 528). But it is of course precisely the insinuation of a 
normative judgement, as well as the vagueness with which the term is used that shapes the 
politics of security. “Terrorism has been used in a calculatedly undefined and indefinite, 
rather than specific, way. It names not a specific Other, but a general and omnipresent threat” 
(Makdisi 2002: 266). 
   The idea of the omnipresent threat has shaped the new measures in that they raise 
‘suspicion’ to a new importance as grounds for action: suspicion as grounds for governmental 
action undermines the presumption of innocence. Particularly policing laws now involve 
suspicion, or the idea of the potential of a risk to a much larger degree. Previous legal 
distinction between suspicion (that entitles the police to investigate) and prognoses or 
probable cause, that is: the well-founded expectation of an event to occur that entitles the 
police to use preventive measures, have been abandoned in many places. ‘Prevention’ – with 
the expansion of policing into peoples’ lives before anything has happened – is the task of the 
day. Prevention, that seemingly innocent word, relates to the idea of controlling potentials, of 
surveying future possibilities, of controlling not what people did or do or are planning to do 
but what they might at some point do. Prevention changes security from a matter of politics 
into one of technology, involving specialists’ knowledge of risks and their preemption (see 
also Bigo 2002: 74). Thus, this innocent word ‘prevention’, so much less brutal than 
repression, so much less vindictive than punishment entails possibilities for the expansion of 
state powers that potentially undermine not only civil liberties but also procedures of political 
deliberation.  
   The measures legislated in various countries all seem to have in common a change in the 
division of powers; they often entail an (often only implicit) strengthening of the executive 
and an increase in the competencies of the security agencies. As mentioned above, most of the 
legislation now enacted entails measures that had been debated for a long time in connection 
with other perceived threats such as ‘organised crime’, drug trafficking etc. (see e.g. 
                                                 
5 POTA was introduced as an ordinance in 2001 and passed by the Indian parliament in a joint session with the 
upper house in 2002 against the fierce resistance of the opposition. 
6 For a review of the legislation in various countries see Amnesty International or Bascombe 2003 and 2004. 
7 The problems of defining terrorism are discussed by Charles Tilly 2004 among others.  
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Crenlinsten 1998). Some new legislation revived earlier security laws; some built upon 
existing legislation (for Germany see: Hirsch 2002: 7; for India see: Krishnan 2004; for the 
US see Cole 2004; for Malaysia see Bascombe 2003). Most new legislations envision new 
forms of cooperation between the different security agencies, i.e. the police, internal and 
external intelligence services and the military, the path for which was prepared in many 
countries with reference to the new challenges posed by globalisation and by transnational 
criminal networks. There is, accordingly, a certain diffusion of the distinction between 
internal and external security (Bigo 2001), expressed practically in the new tasks of 
collaboration between the above mentioned services or legislated in new competences for 
some sections of the army, border security etc.8  
   Some shifts in the division of power are encoded in law, as for example the extended 
periods of legal detention in many countries before an arrested person must appear before a 
magistrate. This has always been one of the most common measures of anti-terrorism 
legislation (Crenlinsten 1998: 405) and is being employed again for example not only in the 
PATRIOT ACT in the US, which allows indefinite detention of non-deportable non-US 
citizens, but also in the British anti-terrorism law; the now repealed Indian anti-terrorist law 
POTA; in Singapore; in South Africa’s anti-terrorism bill; or in the Philippines, where the 
immigration law is used for indefinite detention. Encoded in law are also the new surveillance 
measures, stop and search licenses and similar methods without judicial warrant as in the US, 
in Belarus, in Germany and France (see Amnesty International). The severe problems of the 
detainees at Guantanamo and other US detention centres to gain access to law are the most 
extreme example of these developments.  
   Many laws, particularly those concerning changes in arrest laws and detention laws and the 
expansion of police powers, explicitly sideline the judiciary or reduce its role. Thus, Rorty’s 
warning that “the courts would be brushed aside, and the judiciary would lose its 
independence” (Rorty 2004: 10) might already be beginning to take shape, and possibly with 
the connivance of the judiciary. To examine how the judiciary has reacted to the curtailing of 
its powers and autonomy, and whether there were struggles, unwitting collaboration or 
unanimity about the process of shifting the balance within the division of powers, could throw 
light on processes whereby a consensus is forged within a state apparatus and beyond on the 
necessity of changes in the structure of the state implied in the new measures. 
                                                 
8 Didier Bigo interprets the developments within the security agencies as a move on their part to develop a new 
field of activity and give themselves a new lease on life after the end of the Cold War made them well-nigh 
redundant (Bigo 2002: 64). Richard Rorty warns of the advent of the security agencies as “de facto rulers” 
(Rorty 2004: 11). 
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   It is not that unanimity reigns everywhere about the necessity of a shifting balance of power. 
The conditions for and precise processes of generating a consensus and overcoming 
competing interests or oppositional positions within the state apparatus are thus in themselves 
a matter for analysis. Consensus seems to be dependent on the successful portrayal of an ‘us 
vs. them’ distinction so as to make security measures appear to target only ‘them’ and identify 
the state with ‘us’, rendering public enemies and private enemies quasi-identical. Wherever 
such a dichotomy could not be convincingly established, either, it seems, because the 
targeting of all by state security measures was too fresh like in Kenya, or, as in many Muslim 
majority countries, because no essential alienness could be argued, the plausibility of the 
necessity of the security measures, or their beneficial nature for the ‘good citizen’ seems to 
have been less evident. Thus, unanimity on securitisation apparently proceeds best alongside 
the dichotomisation of society. More on this below. 
   Not in all cases is the shift towards further competencies for the executive and for security 
agencies encoded in law. Often it is produced by the practices of state agencies such as the 
greater reliance of the judiciary on intelligence reports (taking them as proof that makes 
further evidence unnecessary), and generally the enhanced status of intelligence information 
for political decision making. This relates also to the apparently increased legitimacy of 
secrecy of governmental activities within democratic regimes. Secrecy is couched not only in 
terms of security needs but also in terms of expert knowledge. It relates to an increased 
authority of specialised agencies to ‘know best’. This curtails the powers of legislatures. 
Added to this is often a new level of ‘loyalty’ of the fourth estate, the media, in relation to 
governmental policies towards Muslims and Islam.  
   In the wave of legislative activities around the world after September 11th we also see a 
reclassification of domestic conflicts and an integration of various policy fields into the anti-
terrorism strategy. Thus, the introduction of new security measures has had repercussions in 
the legal organisation of fields not immediately related to terrorist activities. In fact, the 
identification of the fields that are directly related to the threat of terrorism and which, 
therefore, have to be addressed by the new security measures, is a matter of contestation. 
Because of the allegedly diffuse nature of the terrorist threat, policy makers and different state 
agencies adopt encompassing visions of the new necessities of preventive control: not only 
financial transactions, organised crime and illegal border crossing are under observation, but 
also whole geographical areas have been classified as potential ‘bases’ of terrorist 
organisations that demand intervention (such as the Sahel region, and of course Taliban 
Afghanistan). Moreover, policies towards minorities, towards migration and immigrants 
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(whether naturalised or not),9 towards religious (Islamic) or minority rights organisations and, 
of course, towards data protection have been re-thought in connection with current 
perceptions of the threat of terrorism.  
   This securitisation of various policy fields has not only changed administrative priorities 
within these fields; it has moreover made possible the use of administrative and procedural 
law for security concerns. Procedural and administrative law are used in many places to 
circumvent the safeguards built into criminal law (see Cole 2003: 14). Moreover, 
administrative procedures are used where criminal law would not hold as those targeted 
cannot be convincingly accused of committing a crime recognised by penal law (Schiffauer 
2005b). Legal status thus attains a new significance in matters of fundamental rights and the 
access to law since the universality of protections under criminal law do not pertain to 
administrative procedures or immigration law etc. for which legal status is of course central 
(see also Bender 2003). Germany is using its Law for Foreigners (Ausländerrecht) and its 
provisions for deportation and denial of entry rather than criminal law to deal with people 
considered to potentially pose a security risk. The reasoning holds that thereby potential 
danger is banished from German territory – regardless of the disproportionality of the 
measures and irrespective of the violation of fundamental rights.  
 
Citizenship and Culture 
 
Consequently, the conceptualisation of citizenship has undergone implicit but fundamental 
changes. Firstly, there is a shift of rights and duties in favour of the state related to the new 
role of suspicion: “because ‘the risk’ exists always and everywhere, it becomes normality; to 
be harmless is then the exception that has to be proven by the citizen for his or her own 
person.” (Denninger 2001: 472, my translation) 
   Although this has been posed as a general description of anti-terrorism measures by those 
who fear for the future of civil rights, not all people are equally likely to be suspect and come 
under observation. The ‘war on terror’ operates with categories that are for the most part 
ascriptive categories. What I mean is that the classification of people as potentially dangerous 
relates only marginally or not at all to their actual activities. Rather, because of the alleged 
elusiveness of ‘the enemy’, suspect subjects are classified according to their religious or 
national background, their ethnicity, their associations or other so called ‘characteristics’. 
These form the basis of the current data gathering and surveillance activities. Surveillance, 
                                                 
9 In debates in the European Parliament a close connection between terrorism and immigration is frequently 
made; see Tsoukala (2004: 3); see also Bigo 2002. 
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registration, the gathering of personal data, tracking e-mails and internet usage, monitoring 
financial transactions and above all stop-and-search and ‘sneak-and-peak’ searches are, in the 
end, not undertaken indiscriminately but according to criteria such as race, religion and 
national background. All involve categories and classification that are not related to the 
activities of those targeted but to their legal status, their history (migration), their nationality 
or their religious affiliation. “Seeing like a state” (Scott 1998) in the war on terror involves 
categories that are at the same time selective and distinctive but also broad and vague. 
   Connected to these categories and classifications, a new focus on national homogeneity is 
emerging; heterogeneity is perceived as a ‘problem’ to be tackled and potentially a security 
risk. Of course, heterogeneity has often been considered and treated as a problem, not only 
since the rise of the idea of the nation state, and particularly in Western immigration 
countries.10 However, the current idea of homogeneity, implicit as it is in the categories of 
‘potential danger’ does not only supersede heterogeneity (or specific kinds of ethnic or 
religious forms of heterogeneity) but introduces instead a dichotomy related to the spectre of 
the clash of civilisation. Some forms of heterogeneity are thus not a matter of difference or 
plurality but of alienness. This firstly targets Muslim minorities. While distinctions are made 
on all levels of the new security discourses (mostly by non-Muslims) between ‘good 
Muslims’ and ‘bad Muslims’, between Islam and Islamism, and despite the references to the 
similarities between the abrahamitic religions, the implicit labelling of people (and of types of 
conflicts) under the quasi-explanatory heading of Islam constructs Muslims as the ‘other’. 
This construction, rooted as it is in the history of Western imperialism (Mamdani 2004; 
Agnes 2005), also relegates Islam to the realm of the innately pre-modern. Unlike others 
designated as pre-modern, Islam is assumed to be also largely anti-modern, thus replacing 
philanthropic or paternalist relations designed for the purely pre-modern with those of “fear 
and preemptive police or military action.” (Mamdani 2004: 18)  
   Social discourses of ‘othering’ differ, and particularly in countries with a majority Muslim 
population, they take on different forms of distinguishing between others that can be re-
integrated and others that are essentially alien. The question in this paper, however, is when 
do complex systems of ‘othering’ give way to simple dichotomisations. 
   The impact of this dichotomisation on group relations, both the relation between majority 
and minority populations and social relations within targeted groups, has yet to be explored, 
and even more so since the concept of ‘the sleeper’ as the undiscovered and undiscoverable 
‘dangerous other’ has complicated the relation between assimilation and ‘otherness’. The 
                                                 
10 As Nina Glick Schiller has pointed out in a personal communication, in the US there has often been a 
relationship between anti-immigration laws and assimilation campaigns and measures against religious and 
political diversity, which even included de-naturalisation. See also Cole 2003. 
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sleeper is an idea of invisible otherness; it questions commonly held ideas of similarity and 
belonging while those who are clearly identifiable as (practising) Muslims are still associated 
with their religion have gained the nimbus of the quintessential ‘other’ and are therefore often 
considered or even treated as potentially suspect, the real danger is now seen in those who 
cannot be seen as being different, but are assumed to be essentially so. The allegedly 
malevolent concealment of their essential otherness justifies the return to criteria of “heritage” 
in blood or ethnicity for distinguishing between us and them.  
   Related to this, conceptualisations of different ‘degrees of membership’ in polities have 
gained a new saliency. The idea of a national core culture, be it the so-called ‘Judeo-Christian 
tradition’ of Europe – which, of course, officially became ‘Judeo’ only after the annihilation 
of six million Jews in Europe – or, for example, Hinduism in India, which different groups 
can be more or less close to, and which bestows on them more or less legitimate claims to 
membership, re-emerges as a notion of political organisation. Claims to membership and 
membership itself can have different degrees of legitimacy, and this legitimacy is being 
grounded more generally in an ius sanguinis and/or a religio-cultural complex. 
   This culturalisation of membership rights enters legal categories in naturalisation 
procedures, legal grounds for expulsion or denial of entry, observation, screening and 
inspection of whole categories of the population (rather than of individuals). It is thus not 
mere rhetoric; it undermines our very principles of universality by re-introducing systems of 
dual law. 
 
Dual Law 
 
The attachment of civil rights to membership ideas that rely not on formal criteria but on 
criteria of ‘culture’ or ‘blood’ is visible in the tendencies towards a shift of the burden of 
proof onto members of certain social categories and very concretely in the policing laws that 
ground legitimate police action in mere suspicion, or even merely the ‘potential’ of a person 
committing a crime: if whole categories of people are considered potential threats, individuals 
belonging to these categories have to prove their non-dangerousness. This abandons the 
presumption of innocence and introduces a measure of Sippenhaftung, i.e. the collective 
liability of family members, co-religionists, or others categorised as having the ‘same’ 
characteristics. If ascriptive membership or legal or merely ‘biographical’ status such as that 
of being an ‘immigrant’ – and particularly a Muslim one, whether naturalised or not – is 
enough to provide grounds for suspicion, and suspicion now provides grounds for police 
action, this shift of the burden of proof is extended to people who have not engaged in any 
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criminal activity but are suspected of having the potential at some point to do so because of 
their religious or national background, their legal status, their acquaintances or possibly their 
extended family relations (see also Cole 2003: 2). The presumption of innocence is restricted 
to ‘us’, for ‘them’ there is the suspicion of guilt.  
   The changing conceptualisation of citizenship is thus visible in the developments that lead 
to unequal structures of access to law. Not only citizenship rights but even basic civil rights 
and human rights that should pertain to all persons on the territory of a state, whether citizen 
or not, whether legally or illegally present, attain a new character as they become attached to 
conditions either of membership or of ‘worth’.  
   Adding to a culturalisation of membership is a moralisation of rights. Although all rights, 
and all law entails at its core moral ideas, the principle of equality before the law is based on 
the idea that law’s validity is independent of the moral judgement about the behaviour or 
character of a person. The new moralisation that re-attaches rights to the moral worth of a 
person – as judged by those that can provide access to or deny rights – is visible in extremis in 
the treatment of ‘unlawful enemy combatants’ in Guantanamo and other places of detention 
and in its justification by Dick Chaney when he said: “the people that are at Guantanamo are 
bad people.”11 These detentions not only contravene any codes of international law, but also 
introduce the logic of the rights of (assumed) terrorists to be less important, less valuable than 
the rights of others since they are ‘bad people’. There are two versions of this argument. 
Firstly, it has been held that the protection of the rights of (alleged or convicted) terrorists is 
not compatible with justice since the protection of their rights would violate the rights of their 
victims and even their potential victims (see for example the debates of the European 
Parliament as described in Tsoukala 2004: ft 27 and 28). Secondly, the denial of rights with 
the argument that a person is ‘bad’ goes in some ways even further since it categorically 
denies those esteemed to be ‘bad’ the right to have rights. Jakobs has defined the duty of the 
state for a “law for enemies” (Feindstrafrecht) in the following manner: “whoever does not 
provide sufficient cognitive securities of behaviour as a person cannot expect to be treated as 
a person. More, the state must not treat him as a person since he would otherwise violate the 
right to security of other persons.” (Jakobs 2004: 93, my translation) 
   The re-moralisation of rights in this manner, of connecting access to law, or the right to 
have rights to the moral value of a person – a moral value, that is defined, of course, by those 
that can determine access – and the new role of the state in defining morally worthy citizens 
or people adds to old forms of exclusion new forms of legitimising (and legalising) inequality 
before the law.  
                                                 
11 Dick Chaney on Fox News Channel, Monday 13th June 2005. 
  
12
   The construction of a normative community that is evident in all the Manichaean and 
belligerent oppositions of civilisation vs. barbarism, freedom vs. hatred, ‘with us or against 
us’ etc. condemns certain categories of people who are considered morally not to be members 
of the normative community to the state of outlaws. This exclusion, again, is not done 
according to the activities or deeds of the persons concerned but according to their religious or 
national background. “If to live by the rule of law is to belong to a common political 
community, then does not the selective application of the rule of law confirm a determination 
to relegate entire sections of humanity as conscripts of a civilisation fit for collective 
punishment?” (Mamdani 2004: 257)  
   This dual system of law finds its climactic formulation in the debate on a special criminal 
law for ‘enemies’ as practically invented by the US in its detention centres (of which 
Guantanamo is only one), or the ‘Feindstrafrecht’ as it has been called in German (Jakobs 
2004). A special criminal law for ‘public enemies’ is emerging. It differs from other criminal 
law in that it creates different legal standards for ‘enemies’ whatever that may be, and even 
for potential ‘enemies’. Since the point of the law for enemies is prevention of future deeds 
(Jakobs 2004: 92) an enemy cannot be distinguished from a potential enemy. The 
identification of a potential of a person to become an enemy will differ: it can either rely on 
previous deeds, or on intentions and processes of planning, or on membership in specific 
organisations or on categories of people that are deemed potentially hostile. Guantanamo and 
other centres of detention, and the whole concept of ‘unlawful enemy combatants’, are the 
beginnings of such a special criminal law for ‘enemies’. However, it is also visible in the 
circumvention of ‘normal’ criminal law and its safeguards by the use of administrative law in 
security measures. 
   Philosophically, these ideas of dealing with ‘the enemy’ have frequently been related to the 
fundamental distinction between friend and foe that was for Carl Schmitt, the German jurist 
whose ideas gave Nazism a justification in legal philosophy and political theory, the essence 
of the political. Schmitt, unlike the propagators of the ‘war on terror’ does not write about 
morals;12 he insists that the opposition between friend and foe that underlies the political is in 
no way related to the opposition between good and evil (Schmitt [1932] 1963: 27) or any 
other such opposition. Schmitt does of course hold that the existence of the state (state 
security) supersedes all other legal norms: “In a state of emergency the state suspends law by 
virtue of its right to self-preservation” (Schmitt [1934] 1985: 19, my translation). This is 
                                                 
12 Denninger 2005 sees Fichte, rather than Carl Schmitt, as the original thinker of the law for enemies, the 
Feindstrafrecht (Denninger 2005: 9).  Fichte’s ideas on the outlaw are also cited by Jakobs 2004 in his advocacy 
of this kind of law, although Jakobs uses also Kant and Hobbes for the justification of Feindstrafrecht (2004: 89-
91). 
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reminiscent of the US’s justifications for the suspension of rights during the ‘war on terror’, 
although US officials have usually used a more mundane language than Schmitt’s theoretical 
elaborations. 
   The law for enemies also differs from ordinary criminal law in that it does not intend to 
rehabilitate, reform or even punish, but, above all, to banish (see Jakobs 2004: 89). 
Banishment, of course, can be a punishment more severe than other kinds of penalties. All 
measures, those seemingly banal ones of gathering data on to the religious belonging of a 
person or those dramatic ones at the detention centres, are justified largely with reference to 
‘banishing danger’ or preventing it from materialising: indefinite detention at Guantanamo 
has been justified by pointing out that some of the detainees that had been released had taken 
up the fight against US forces again and that this needed to be prevented.13 In Germany the 
use of the Law for Foreigners (Ausländerrecht) and its provisions for deportation and denial 
of entry rather than of criminal law to deal with people considered to potentially posing a 
security risk is justified by the idea that thereby potential danger is banished from German 
territory.14  
   Banishing danger is the core idea of the preventive state. It relates to what Garland has 
described as the ‘culture of control’ that de-socialises crime, and gives up on rehabilitation or 
reform and restricts itself to “retribution, incapacitation and the management of risk” (Garland 
2001: 8). The enemy (and the criminal) are perceived to be beyond redemption or the 
possibility of (re-)integration because their deviance is seen to be rooted in their ‘nature’ or 
personality (Garland 2001: 181) rather than in the social context.  
 
 “Intrinsic evil defies all attempts at rational comprehension or criminological 
explanation. There can be no mutual intelligibility, no bridge of understanding, no real 
communication between ‘us’ and ‘them’. To treat them as understandable (…) is to 
bring criminals into our domain, to humanise them, to see ourselves in them and them 
in ourselves.” (Garland 2001: 184)  
 
   The externalisation of ‘the enemy’ is, of course, all the more plausible when the explanation 
for his ‘difference’ is strengthened by reference to ‘another culture’ and its fundamental 
‘otherness’ or the perception of a ‘new terrorism’ that it is fuelled by an innate hatred of 
modernity. Because the ‘enemy’, the deviant or the criminal are in this way treated as 
essentially different and thus beyond (re-)integration, they primarily need to be banished, 
                                                 
13 Dick Cheney, quoted in Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15th June 2005, “Schlechte Menschen”, p. 10. 
14 The contradiction inherent in the call for a global ‘war on terror’ and the practice of banishing people 
considered to be potentially a security risk beyond national boundaries is not addressed. In this way, the US 
detention centres and all forms of indefinite detention are consequent to the proclaimed globality of the ‘war on 
terror’. 
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excluded, incapacitated. For Garland it is the prison that is “located precisely at the junction 
point of two of the most important social and penal dynamics of our time: risk and 
retribution” (Garland 2001: 199). Of course, expulsion, deportation or the denial of entry, 
have the same potentials for the management of risk, and they have similar if sometimes more 
fundamental aspects of retribution or punishment (see Bender 2003: 132). 
   Banishing danger de-socialises conflicts; it de-politicises terrorism and merges ideas of 
innate alienness with (in many cases largely) administrative procedures of exclusion. Since in 
the ‘war on terror’ banishing is done categorically, that is, to categories of people rather than 
to individuals according to their deeds and activities, and since it cannot be done other than 
categorically since ‘we do not know where and who exactly the enemy is’, it creates that 
Schmittean distinction between us and them. The belligerent opposition of ‘good and evil’, 
‘freedom and hatred’, ‘civilisation and barbarism’ is thus not mere rhetoric or the creation of 
enemy images but has already entered the procedures of law and administration.  
   The inadvertent proximity of general trends in policing, of the preventive posture of the war 
on terror, and the ideas of Schmitt have triggered a debate on the advent of the permanent 
state of emergency (Agamben 2003). But just as debates on the general threat to civil liberties 
posed by security measures – which is, of course, also a valid criticism – overlook the 
development of a dual class system of rights, the idea of the age of exceptionalism also seems 
to miss the asymmetry of the state of emergency. Of course, all states of emergency do not 
target all citizens equally; usually they target certain forms of behaviour and certain activities 
equally, regardless of the person in question – denying rights to these actions. The current 
situation, however, treats certain activities differently according to who ‘commits’ them. 
“While there has been much talk about the need to sacrifice liberty for a greater sense of 
security, in practice we have selectively sacrificed non-citizens’ liberties while retaining basic 
protections for citizens” (Cole 2002: 955, emphasis in the original). Since citizenship now 
comes in different degrees,15 the protection of someone’s liberties and rights depends also on 
his or her degree of legitimate membership. Generally, criticism and opposition to the politics 
of security have not been forcibly stifled. Indeed, there are many dissenting voices from 
human rights organisations, lawyers and academics. Beyond a potential general threat to civil 
liberties entailed in the new measures, it is the idea of equality before the law that seems to be 
undermined in a new manner – and with a new degree of legitimacy.  
                                                 
15 A case in point beside the various cases of the revocation of citizenship when the persons concerned hold a 
double citizenship and one is revoked, is one case in which German citizenship was revoked despite the person 
in question having no other citizenship, and having committed no deed other than not declaring his membership 
in a organisation that is under observation by the German Federal Security Agency. The organisation in question 
is not outlawed and has not even been accused or is suspected of promoting violence or similar such 
unconstitutional activities. 
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The Global War on Terror 
 
Although many countries around the world adopted new or re-enforced preexisting legislation 
(e.g Bascombe 2003) after 9/11, and were obliged to do so by the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373, the war on terror played itself out differently in different countries. Not all 
countries jumped onto the bandwagon of the new discourse of security. Some, of course, were 
excluded from the outset, being seen as part of the enemy; and some only joined the agenda 
after they had been pressured by the US and the EU, for example with the threat of 
withholding aid. There were several governments that hesitated to join the war on terror or to 
link their domestic problems to its agenda, such as Indonesia and Morocco. Both joined the 
war on terror only after ‘their own’ terrorist disasters: Bali and Casablanca.  
   What differed was, however, not only the readiness to join the agenda, but also the ways the 
agenda was used and implemented. For different governments it served different ends. Some, 
such as Russia, China, Uganda or the Philippines used the politics of security mainly to justify 
their own wars against insurgents. Others instrumentalised the measures against political 
opposition, tendencies observable for example in Egypt, or Malaysia. Yet other governments, 
such as those of Mali or of Djibouti16 sought out the new possibilities in acquiring aid 
inherent in the anti-terrorism strategies of the US. Others were forced to introduce anti-
terrorism measures (Bascombe 2004: 4), mainly the small islands of the Caribbean and the 
Pacific that had to change their financial or gambling laws to enable the surveillance of 
transnational financial transactions and money laundering operations. They were pressured 
both by the US and the EU with the threat of withholding financial aid.17 The introduction of 
anti-terror measures in line with the new international architecture of security became part of 
development politics.18 “Across the world recipients of USAID assistance must now sign 
agreements conforming to anti-terrorist conditions as contractually expressed” (Large 2005: 
3; see also Bachmann 2004: 6). Thus, legal innovations, technologies and ideas about security 
and danger entered different countries in ways related to their local tensions and concerns. 
   Processes of othering differed too. They connected to local plausibilities, and in some 
countries they failed to take root. Countries with significant Muslim minorities, such as the 
European countries or India differed from countries with Muslim majority populations. 
                                                 
16 Djibouti for example received $ 30 Million for letting the US establish a permanent military base. 
17 Another means of pressure is the blacklist of Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories of the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF). 
18 Little material is yet available to answer the question of whether the securitisation of development relates 
beneficially or detrimentally to aid objectives such as poverty alleviation. Since large funds are designated for 
security enhancement, such as police training, air safety etc., priorities within aid allocation are definitely 
changing. See for example http://www.bond.org.uk/advocacy/globalsecurity.htm. 
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Muslim majority countries, however, also differed widely in their reactions depending not so 
much on their democratic or authoritarian set up but on the status of religion in their state 
ideology.  
   Despite the differences in the ways the ‘war on terror’ entered into national or local politics, 
it is leaving its traces in many places. The question is in how far the export of policy 
transports not only specific legal provisions and security technologies but also schemes of 
understanding crime and risk and security as well as categorisations of the dangerous other. 
Although the ways of adopting policy is shaped by regional or local concerns, the ideas and 
procedures characteristic of the ‘war on terror’ seem also to be exported because in their 
encompassing and rather unspecific nature they offer themselves for various purposes to 
different actors. The justificatory imagery of the ‘war on terror’ that accompanies the specific 
measures can subsume diverse conflicts under the banner of the ‘new terrorism’. As 
mentioned above, they have served several authoritarian regimes to justify their oppression of 
opposition and dissent, Uzbekistan being only the most dramatic recent example. They could 
likewise be used to relate all sorts of Muslim led insurgencies to ‘global terrorism’ and to 
justify strategies towards regions of unrest accordingly. Of course, new relations might in fact 
have been established between different local or regional armed groups and others, or with Al 
Qaida. But the re-classification of these conflicts went further as it justified approaches to 
tackling different instances of unrest that had so far been illegitimate, often legalising 
practices that had hitherto been illegal.  
   But the new laws were also instrumentalised in less obvious ways in various conflicts. In 
India, for example, they were used by politicians of various parties – even those that had 
initially opposed the new law – against political competitors. The great majority of cases 
under the anti-terrorism law POTA were against Muslims, among them those who were 
charged in relation to the burning of a train carrying Hindu nationalists.19 In this way, India 
did not differ from the general trend. The rise of Hindu nationalism as an idiom for political 
reasoning even beyond the Hindu nationalist organisations provided a fertile ground for the 
adoption of the ‘war on terror’. However, in India, but also in Morocco, the new possibilities 
for damaging an opponent inherent in the laws also entered into extremely local quarrels, 
being used as a weapon in struggles and disputes at the neighbourhood level, or in local 
                                                 
19 While over a hundred Muslims were charged under the draconian POTA, often without the slightest proof of 
their involvement in the fire (and it is still not clear whether the fire was not due to an accident rather than to 
arson) none of those considered responsible for or those hundreds involved in the pogroms against Muslims in 
Gujarat, in which over 2000 Muslims died, were charged even under the common criminal law. Justifying the 
refusal to charge the rioters under POTA, members of the ruling party BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party, the leading 
Hindu nationalist party in India) explained that POTA was for anti-national violence while the riots had been 
national in spirit. 
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rivalries amongst different economic groups (Turner 2005) and became a powerful weapon 
for the police and anybody in league with them.20 
   Not only governments made use of the new possibilities for ‘preemptive punishment’ and 
control inherent in the security measures; civil society actors, too, adopted the measures for 
their own purposes. They also often adopted the particular approach to conflicts and to rights 
promoted in the discourses accompanying the ‘war on terror’. Through the adoption of the 
measures, their justificatory imagery of friend vs. foe, of the ‘unworthy other’, of the 
moralisation of rights also enters into the practices of those using the measures. This imagery 
can be as useful as the measures in themselves, since subsuming diverse conflicts under one 
banner potentially creates new alliances21 that strengthen different agendas thereby united 
against a common enemy. 
   Decisive for the social life of anti-terrorism laws seems to be whether there is or emerges a 
congruence between governmental categories of ‘the dangerous other’ and societal forms of 
othering. This seems to have had an impact on the ways in which preventive measures may 
expand and whether dual law structures emerge.  
   The export of ideas through the export of policy thus succeeds best when there is an 
additional local use for the exports. So far it is mainly in those countries and societies where 
social tensions can be interpreted along the lines of the ‘war on terror’, that is, where the foe 
can be externalised from society by some means and such externalisations have their history 
that dual law emerges, and the culturalisation of membership and the moralisation of rights 
takes root.  
 
Resistance 
 
In a few countries, resistance to the expansion of anti-terrorist measures seems to have born 
fruit – for different reasons. In Kenya their introduction was prevented by public protests 
(Bachmann 2004: 5), apparently largely because of the memory of authoritarian rule still so 
fresh in the public’s mind. In Mauritius, both the president and vice president refused to give 
assent to the Prevention of Terrorism Special Measures Regulations that was enacted in 2003 
and resigned. In India the new anti-terrorist law POTA was resisted when the BJP passed it by 
                                                 
20 The measures were more easily instrumentalised in this manner when the targets were Muslim, since then they 
could be more plausibly connected to the global discourse of the ‘dangerous other’, but some prominent cases 
also involved non-Muslim politicians opposed to the regional leading parties. 
21 One striking new alliance is that in Germany between left wing feminists, such as Alice Schwarzer, and right 
wing politicians who both oppose Islam in the name of protecting women against ‘tradition’. In India, on the 
other hand, the hijacking of women’s issues by the Hindu Right was resisted by the feminist movement, albeit 
not always successfully.  
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parties in opposition (and of course many civil rights activists) and it was repealed by the 
Congress led government that came to power in 2004. This might not have been for the love 
of civil liberties but for other political reasons and it also does not necessarily mean that the 
new Indian government employs entirely different practices against what it classifies as 
terrorism.22 Nonetheless, these examples raise the question of what the conditions are for 
‘logics’ other than that of the preventive state to be effective, other perceptions of the 
situation to be accepted and other voices to be heard – and why this is not so elsewhere. 
   In many countries, especially those in the West, previous resistance to far reaching security 
measures seems to have dissolved.23 This is due, it seems, firstly to the emergence of dual 
law: since most people actually do not feel – rightly or wrongly – that they might be a target 
of the new laws since they do not belong to the categories of people who are addressed by 
them, they also do not oppose measures that they would otherwise find unacceptable (see also 
Hirsch 2002: 6).24 The production of clarity by locating societal woes in a foe – who is 
without history or reason – potentially overcomes the deep ambivalence towards some 
surveillance measures and other expansions of state control. The dichotomisation of good and 
(potentially) dangerous, of worthy members and suspicious subjects and the apparent 
bifurcation of the threat (of being a victim of terrorist attack and of being victim of the war on 
terror) reproduce the dichotomy of us and them underlying the dual law system. 
   Secondly, there seems to be a new consensus on a conceptualisation of security and risk that 
relates individual, national and international security in a new manner. The security discourse 
elevates state security above all other forms of security, especially above social security, but 
also above civic security (i.e. the security from the state, habeas corpus, privacy etc.). This 
rests on the claim that state security is the precondition for other forms of (individual or 
societal) security. Accordingly, the distinction between private and public enemies is 
dissolved (Bigo 2002: 81). The politics of “unease” as Bigo has called it (Bigo 2002), the new 
role of fear that can be witnessed in the dramatic scenarios in the media, the moral panics, as 
several authors have described the new Islamophobia (Schiffauer 2005a), bring about a return 
to Hobbes – who had probably never been very far anyway. New ideas of security become 
common sense in the acceptance of governmental authority to know best how to protect and 
                                                 
22 India amended its unlawful activities (prevention) bill to include some of the provisions of the repealed POTA. 
However, it abolished the provisions on indefinite detention and on confessions to the police being admitted in 
court, thus abandoning those measures most prone to misuse. 
23 There are of course many voices of dissent such as human rights organisations, immigrant rights and asylum 
groups, concerned lawyers etc. As suggested above, they have not been forcibly silenced. Their media presence 
is, however, marginal. Moreover, their dissenting opinions remain marginal also in the face of the social 
dichotomisation already prevalent. 
24 An indication of this is also the outcry caused by the suggestion in Britain to extend the powers of detention 
without trial inherent in the British anti-terrorism law to all Britons in order to make the law less discriminative 
(Large 2005: 3). 
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from what. Thus, it seems that the structures created and the laws passed do affect political 
practices and social relations far beyond their immediate goal. 
 
Research Needs 
 
While the contradictions between the various measures taken and civil liberties or 
international law have been addressed by jurists and political scientists, their impact on social 
relations has as yet hardly been explored. In order to explore the social significance of the 
new legal measures, four fields of inquiry emerge as particularly important.  
 
State Processes 
Firstly, we need to look at how the preventive state actually comes about in practice. We need 
to look closely at the adoption, adaptation, instrumentalisation and circumvention of the new 
politics of security by different actors, the ways consensus was achieved, and the interactions 
of various state agencies, the government, the media etc., in order to trace the dynamics of 
both expansion and possibly limitation or modification and reproduction of the preventive 
state and its institutions. This involves an evaluation of how and in what cases anti-terrorism 
laws have been used in different contexts and how domestic political issues and problems of 
security are linked to the international agenda of combating terrorism.  
   The implicit changes in the division of powers can only be assessed if the interactions 
between different state agencies and their routine practices are studied. It is therefore of 
interest to identify the actors behind different practices. This also concerns the study of the 
implementation of the new laws or previously existing laws: many of the changes seem to lie 
in the actual practices with which these are interpreted and employed. Therein lie the often 
implicit reformulations of norms. We also need to look closely at the unintended outcomes of 
strategies and policies, of practices of instrumentalisation and of adaptation to be able to 
provide an empirical analysis of the current developments. 
 
Dual Law 
A second field of research concerns the emergence of unequal access to law, of two tiered 
systems of law or dual law. Since dual law tendencies are often not explicit in legislations the 
ways in which such unequal access to law or dual law is de facto created need to be explored.  
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Reactions 
Related to this is a third field of inquiry, which examines the reactions of targeted groups to 
labelling and to unequal access to law. One important question is whether these developments 
actually serve to diminish the threat of further terrorist activities and recruitment (see 
Crenshaw 1991). Since they fail to isolate terrorism from widely felt grievances, but rather 
seem to further the plausibility of this link, one could claim that they are likely to produce 
more anger and hatred among those targeted (or: categorically targeted) and thus possibly 
produce more terrorists or at least sympathies with their ideas.  
   The actual ‘production of terrorists’ would be hard to prove, but the reactions of those 
belonging to targeted categories can be assessed in terms of their withdrawal from social 
relations beyond their group and in terms of their identification with and use of norms and 
institutions of a polity. Both are possibly strongly affected by the experience of labelling and 
of unequal access to law. From what we know from research into individual and collective 
identity formation, the measures implemented under the ‘war on terror’ are likely to produce a 
social dichotomisation that leads to experiences of alienation and processes of self-
segregation. These may trigger militancy and anti-systemic violence. 
   The question is thus under what conditions and in which contexts the new security 
discourses lead to a retreat of the targeted groups and further segregation, or even to the 
creation of new tensions and an escalation of conflict? This is important as the social and 
political costs might be high. The social and political costs of escalation seem obvious, but 
also the retreat and further segregation of groups considered and treated with distrust, and 
faced with a constant suspicion has social costs. Organisations that are being criminalised or 
forcibly dissolved might go underground, where they will most likely develop a new internal 
dynamic, structures of leadership and new ideologies towards integration or alienation. 
Moreover, social segregation also often means new social relations within one group, and a 
strengthened exclusivity of identification with that group that entails new dependencies, new 
hierarchies and new structures of communication and trust. 
 
Group Relations and Social Conflict 
Related to this is a fourth field of enquiry, which explores the impact of these developments 
on the way social conflicts are conducted. It seems as if the measures and their accompanying 
justifications in their unspecificity can destroy both social and state institutions of processing 
conflicts. Thus, on the one hand we might observe an increased readiness of state agencies to 
use repressive measures in conflicts with citizens, and increased legal means for this. On the 
other hand, we might observe the dismantling of social institutions of conflict processing 
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institutions between and also within groups. What is of interest here is also to trace the links 
between societal ways of othering and governmental categories.  
Both the question on possible reactions triggered by security measures and their impact on the 
ways conflicts are conducted could also be phrased as the question about the counter-
productive effects of security policies. For security specialists it would mean to ask: what 
security risks do security measures produce. 
 
Development 
One field in which the above questions can be explored and for which legal anthropology is 
especially well equipped is the examination of the impact of the securitisation of 
development. By the securitisation of development I mean the tendencies to subsume 
development objectives under security policies, or to merge security and development 
policies. When priorities within development policies are determined by their alleged effect 
on security issues we observe the securitisation of development. Here it does not suffice to 
evaluate the effects, on the designation of funds, on criteria for distribution and allocation, but 
we also need to trace the transmission of ideas, the transmission of knowledge and of 
(security) technology. We need to ask about the effects of the securitisation of development 
on the division of powers in aid receiving countries, on the ways of dealing with conflicts 
between citizens and the state and on state justifications of limiting freedoms. Moreover, 
knowledge of the impact on group relations, particularly in ethnically heterogeneous societies 
where one group might be more of a target of security measures than others, is of vital 
importance. Thus, it is also a question of the changes in ideas and practices of citizenship, 
both those of state agencies and of citizens and subjects themselves, and of the merger of local 
ideas with a now global imagery. This concerns the imagery of the ‘dangerous other’, the 
ideas about what constitutes security and whose security, as well as the connections that are 
made between individual and state security. It also concerns tendencies towards the 
culturalisation of membership and the moralisation of rights in local arenas.  
 
The New State of the World 
 
Thus, we are left with the question of what changes in the ideas of the state and of 
government have been promoted by the emerging culture of security, and how do they affect 
notions and practices of citizenship. What does the securitisation of politics mean? Is it the 
advent of a general state of emergency (Agamben 2003)?  
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   The claim has been made that these changes serve long term goals of changing state 
structure. Makdisi (2002) as well as Düx (2003), for example, claim that we are observing the 
final push for a general shift from a providing state (either of welfarist or developmental 
nature) to a controlling or preventive state for which ‘terrorism’ is merely an occasion for 
expansion.  
   This thesis is supported by the fact that most legislations claiming to be necessary because 
of the novelty of the ‘new terrorism’, or the general merger of internal and external security 
were in themselves not new but had long been debated in many countries. 9/11 provided an 
opportunity for many governments to overcome some – or most – of the resistance posed by 
parliaments, the media, civil rights groups or the judiciary. Likewise, the re-emergence of 
retribution and incapacitation as a way of dealing with conflicts or with crime has been 
emerging since the late 1990s, as Garland has shown (Garland 2001). Despite these 
precedents, it appears that the ‘war on terror’ gives these developments a new quality: firstly 
it globalises them to a new degree and with a new urgency and force; secondly, it merges 
more tightly independent developments in policing, in development cooperation, in policies 
concerning migration and in notions of citizenship; and thirdly, it introduces the 
culturalisation of membership and moralisation of rights to a new degree and with new 
legitimacy.  
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